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Introduction
We argue that the behavior of experimental subjects in a repeated game can be viewed as a consequence of following the URM procedure proposed in Mas-Colell (2000, 2001) , hereafter HM 1 .
We implement URM in a repeated Traveler's Dilemma game (TDG) originating in Basu (1994) and a Minimum E¤ort Coordination game (MECG) introduced in Van Huyck et al. (1990) to match the experimental outcomes in Capra et al. (1999) (CGGH) and Goeree and Holt (2005) (GH) . Both games belong to the "little treasures of game theory" ) and they have been extensively studied in the literature; see Anderson et al. (2001) , Rubinstein (2006) and Eichberger and Kelsey (2011) among others. In Goeree and Holt (2001) , experiments show that outcomes can be highly sensitive to the change in payo¤ structure which can produce outcomes at odds with the prediction of the Nash equilibrium. Standard explanations of deviations from the Nash equilibrium are the Quantal vladislav.damjanovic@durham.ac.uk 1 See also Young (2007) .
Response Equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey,1995) and k-level bounded rationality (Stahl and Wilson, 1995) among others. Eichberger and Kelsey (2011) show that the experimental outcomes of treasure games may be a consequence of experimental subjects perceiving opponents'behavior as ambiguous.
We show that in the short run, the URM procedure predicts outcomes close to the experimental ones evidenced in CGGH and GH. In case of TDG, the game departure from a Nash equilibrium is temporary since in the long run, and irrespective of cost, the joint play converges to the unique Nash equilibrium. In the case of the MECG, the joint play converges to Nash equilibria that are inversely related to the cost parameter. We also discuss dynamics of joint play towards equilibrium induced by URM with bounded memory (see Saran and Serrano, 2013 ).
Regret Matching
Following HM (2001), consider a particular player i from a group of players N = f1; 2; ::ng engaged in a game against her opponent(s), playing an action s 
is her unconditional regret of not playing action s: URM prescribes playing each action s in the next period with a probability proportional to the positive part of its unconditional regret:
In the long run, URM leads to no-regret for all players, and their joint actions converge to the set of coarse-correlated equilibria CCE (Moulin and Vial, 1978; Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000; Young, 2004) . For a two-player game, CCE is a joint probability distribution P = (p s;
TD Game
Similar to CGGH, the actions are integers from 80 to 200; i.e. s i 2 S := f80; 81; :::199; 200g
and N = f1; 2; ::; 10g: The ith player's payo¤ function is:
with i; j 2 N; i 6 = j. For any value of punishment/reward parameter C > 1 claiming the minimal amount, s = 80 is a unique Nash equilibrium. The experimental outcomes (CGGH) presented in Figure 1 show an inverse relationship between average claim and parameter C:
The sequences of players'claims in period t; fs 2 S is played with a probability prescribed by (2) . The expected claims averaged over N = 1000 simulations for 10 rounds exhibit an inverse relationship with C as shown in Figure 1 .
For intermediary values of the punishment parameter C, the last period claims reported in CGGH are inside 95% con…dence intervals. As C increases, the con…dence intervals move downward, indicating an inverse relationship between the average claim and C: To produce a better match with experimental outcomes, one can use generalized regrets (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2001 ) to transform positive regrets di¤erently across players and actions.
The convergence to equilibrium is illustrated by averaging over N simulated claims 2 at period T for each C = 5 : 5 : 80. As shown by simulations (left-hand panel in Figure 2 ), the expected claims are not only decreasing in costs but they also decline with T and converge to the unique Nash equilibrium s = 80. Moreover, for each value of C, the claim per period rests at the Nash equilibrium in a …nite time T inversely related to C: Evolutions of expected claims (averaged over 200 simulated paths) for di¤erent C ( Figure  2) show that: (i) for all t, there is a strict ordering of average paths preserving the inverse relationship between the expected claims and punishment C and (ii) there is a critical C so that all paths corresponding to C < C are non-monotonic, and all paths with C C are monotonically decreasing.
Minimum-E¤ort Coordination Game
In MECG, N = f1; 2; ::; 10g and actions (e¤orts) of player i; s i 2 S := f110; 111; :::169; 170g are chosen as in GH. The payo¤ function is:
2 Initially, N is chosen to be larger to obtain a smoother distribution of claims. 
with i; j 2 N; and the cost per unit of e¤ort c < 1: In this game, any common e¤ort s is a Nash equilibrium. We focus on the dynamics of e¤ort in round t; de…ned as
The initial e¤orts are uniformly drawn from S: In round t + 1; given histories h i t , actions s i t+1 2 S are played with probabilities proportional to their unconditional regrets calculated by (1) and (5).
In Figure 3 , the expected e¤orts for low and high values of c are presented together with experimental ones (GH) averaged across three di¤erent laboratory sessions. In line with the risk-dominance criterion, 3 there is an inverse relationship between equilibrium e¤orts and costs. In equilibrium, all players coordinate on the same action after some rounds as shown in the left-hand panel of Figure 4 .
To learn more about convergence to equilibrium and equilibrium selection, we calculate an average e¤ort for N = 100 simulations for di¤erent c at periods T = 10; 500; 1000 (righthand panel of Figure 4 ). Convergence to the limiting average e¤ort is clearly established as the di¤erence between average e¤orts in T = 500 (red line) and T = 1000 is negligible. The equilibrium e¤ort is a strictly decreasing function of the cost parameter in some range of intermediary values of c. The highest e¤ort is selected for some range of the lowest 3 A unilateral increase for e = 1 will lead to a decrease in the payo¤ for the amount c while a unilateral decrease for e = 1 will lead to a decrease in the payo¤ for the amount 1 c: Like in a 2x2 game when c < (>)1=2; choosing a higher (lower) e¤ort is a risk dominant action (see HG, 2005 
URM with Finite Memory
As in Saran and Serrano (2012), we introduce bounded memory in the player's strategy assuming that she remembers the last m 1 rounds, so that (1) becomes
with the initial history being generated by URM
Evolutions of expected actions (averaged over N = 200) for both games with di¤erent initial conditions, costs, and memories are shown in Expected claims with …nite memories m = 100; 50; 20 converge faster to the Nash as compared to the unbounded memory case. The shorter the memory, the faster is the convergence. However, by further decreasing the memory, the memory would, at some point, be insu¢ cient to learn Nash and the dynamics could exhibit cycle-like behavior as for m = 9 (red line). The exemption is m = 1; where we have convergence to the Nash 6 :
Simulations show that for small C initially the learning process goes towards higher claims until the information content (history) is su¢ cient for URM to learn 'right'direction. Necessary conditions for that to happen are that the initial claims should not be 'too close' in action space and that the memory should not be too short, i.e. m > 1. For example, for degenerate distributions s i 0 = 180; i = 1; ::; 10; and distributions with initial claims in a small vicinity of either boundary, the non-monotonicity disappears. Further simulations indicate that the non-monotonicity of average claims for small costs is robust with respect to the wide range of initial conditions. Our simulations suggest that URM with a …nite memory may converge to a CCE di¤erent from Nash. For related results with …nite memory in conditional regret matching, see Saran and Serrano (2006) . It would be desirable to get a full characterization of CCEs. Below, we describe one subset of CCE for TDG.
Proposition 1
In a TD game with B A C > 1, the following joint probability distribution represents the CCE equilibrium p zz = p; p yy = 1 p:
where y z + C; (1 p)(y z) C 1; p
Proof. Following (3), we need to show that when Player 1 commits to follow the mediator's advice before it has been seen, the unconditional expectation of her payo¤ is at least as high as her expected payo¤s from playing any other strategy provided that her opponent commits.
Since the game is symmetric, we consider one player with the unconditional expected payo¤ U CC = pz + (1 p)y: i) Consider any strategy x; such that x < z: The expected pay o¤ is x + C; and to ensure that this strategy is not preferable, it must be pz + (1 p)y > z 1 + C x + C , (1 p)(y z) > C 1: ii) For x = z; the payo¤ is pz + (1 p)(z + C), and the necessary condition is pz + (1 p)y > pz + (1 p)(z + C) , y z + C: iii) if z < x < y; the necessary condition is pz + (1 p)y > p(z C) + (1 p)(y 1 + C) , p C 1 2C 1
; iv) if x y, the necessary condition is always satis…ed. The CCE may deliver a higher expected payo¤ for a lower C. The maximum U CC = B C + 1 + and it declines in C.
Conclusion
In our setting, agents learn to play the Nash equilibrium and in contrast to CGGH and GH, deviations from rationality are temporary. This is expected since TDG is a dominance solvable and MECG is a potential game and, as pointed out in Hart (2005) , there exist adaptive heuristics that lead to Nash equilibrium. The initial conditions do not a¤ect the equilibrium outcome, but can a¤ect the dynamics towards equilibrium.
Our simulations do also show that the nature of the equilibrium outcome in games with …nite memory URM could be di¤erent from the case with in…nite histories. Shortening memory may lead to Pareto improvement as in TDG. This should be further investigated.
